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Abstract
We propose a model for analyzing an intermediary’s incentives to increase the
search costs incurred by consumers looking for sellers (stores). First, we show that the
quality of the search service offered to consumers is more likely to be degraded (i.e.
the probability that consumers find their favorite store in the first round of search is
less than 1) when the intermediary derives higher revenues from consumers shopping
at the lesser-known store relative to revenues from consumers shopping at the more
popular store. Second, the intermediary may have an incentive to degrade the quality
of search even further when its design decision influences the prices charged by stores.
By altering the composition of demand faced by stores, the intermediary can force the
latter to price lower and thereby increase total consumer traffic.
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1. Introduction
Conventional wisdom holds that at the most fundamental level, market intermediaries exist
in order to reduce search and transaction costs among the parties they serve and that they
are more valuable the larger the cost savings they generate. This would seem to be true
of both traditional, brick-and-mortar intermediaries (retailers, shopping malls, brokers,
magazines, market exchanges) and "new economy" ones (Amazon, eBay, iTunes, Yahoo!,
etc.), all of which connect buyers and sellers of goods or services.
However, many intermediaries, while providing the relevant information, seem at some
stage of the process to do the opposite of reducing search costs - and by purposeful design
rather than by accident. Shopping malls are designed to maximize the total distance trav-
elled by consumers (and therefore the time spent walking around the mall) while searching
for the particular store(s) they have come to visit. Retail stores themselves stack the prod-
ucts they carry so that the most sought-after items are hard to find and thereby induce
consumers to walk along alleys carrying other products. Popular magazines (e.g. Vogue,
People) are full of advertising, to the extent that it is impossible to find the (little) content
they carry. Finally, it is not clear whether the information and search services provided
by some online portals to users are indeed designed to help the latter in their search for
the particular type of content they are interested in ex-ante, or rather to induce users to
"explore" additional types of content (e.g. sponsored links for search engines like Google,
and recommendation mechanisms on Amazon, iTunes, NetFlix).
In this paper, we challenge the view that intermediaries should aim at minimizing
search costs, and we propose a model which sheds light on the economic motivations that
in some contexts may lead intermediaries to make it harder for the parties they serve
- consumers and third-party sellers - to find each other. First, due to a failure of the
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Coase theorem, consumers may not internalize all the externalities that their activities
generate. In particular, consumers do not account for the gains from trade bestowed
on their trading partners (sellers) when deciding to perform a search of such partners
through an intermediary. This may lead to insufficient search, a "market failure" that the
intermediary may correct by introducing some noise in the search process.
A second motive for degrading the quality of the search service offered to consumers
emerges when this enables the intermediary to affect the prices at which commercial trans-
actions between sellers and consumers (buyers) take place (and direct control of these prices
is not possible). By shaping the search process through adequate design of the intermedia-
tion service, the intermediary can alter the composition of the demand faced by each seller.
Designing the search process in such a way that sellers face a more elastic demand may
force the latter to lower their prices, thereby promoting more transactions and increasing
the overall surplus offered to consumers, even though search quality may be degraded even
further.
This article was in part motivated by the shopping mall example mentioned above (the
applicability of the framework we develop is however much wider than malls). A good
illustration is provided by Roppongi Hills, Tokyo’s most prominent real-estate complex: a
12-hectar mini-city encompassing retail space (filled with shops ranging from Louis Vuitton,
Banana Republic and Zara, to niche, designer brands); an eclectic mix of restaurants and
coffee shops; a large movie-theater; an outdoor arena; a television studio; a luxury hotel,
and two residential buildings; as well as an imposing 54-story office tower. The complex is
described by many observers as a labyrinth and easy to get lost in. Interestingly, this was
apparently a deliberate feature on the part of the designers:
"To convey a feeling of exploration akin to that found in real, organic cities, the archi-
tects opted for a maze-like structure in which visitors and residents could wander around
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for hours, and “discover” new shops and restaurants along the way. The structure was
thought to benefit some of the lesser-known shops and restaurants, but some corporate
tenants were less pleased with the lack of clarity that, they complained, confused their
prospective employees."1
In our model, a monopoly intermediary (or platform) acts as a bottleneck for consumers
to access two "stores" (sellers). The platform derives exogenously given revenues whenever
consumers shop at each of the two stores, but can choose the quality of the search service
it offers consumers, i.e. the probability p that they will find their favorite store in the first
round of search. Consistent with the quote above, our analysis predicts that the platform
(in this case the developer of the complex) may benefit from diverting consumer traffic
from well-known "stores" to lesser-known ones. Specifically, the platform is more likely to
degrade search (i.e. to set p < 1) when the revenues it derives from shopping at the lesser-
known store are sufficiently high relative to the revenues derived from shopping at the more
popular store. By contrast, if consumers were able to find their favorite store immediately,
they would not incur additional search costs to shop at the other store. However, if they
"stumble" upon stores they did not initially plan to visit, they might shop there and then
still go to their favorite store. This can generate positive surplus transactions, which would
not take place if the intermediary provided a perfect search mechanism.
We show that the incentive to degrade search quality survives even when the interme-
diary can charge consumers fees for access to its service or menus of contracts specifying
search quality and a corresponding access fee. We also show that introducing a small
amount of complementarity between stores from the perspective of consumers provides
them with more incentives to visit both stores and therefore makes the intermediary less
1Elberse, Hagiu and Egawa (2007).
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likely to degrade search quality. Conversely, substitutability between stores makes it more
likely that search quality will be less than perfect.
When the prices charged by the two stores are not exogenously fixed but rather set
after having observed the platform’s design choice (p), we show that the platform has
an additional incentive to degrade search quality. Indeed, by doing so, it increases the
proportion of less interested consumers that visit each store. This puts downward pressure
on the prices charged by the stores and results in increased consumer traffic on the platform.
Our paper contributes both to the established economics literature on market interme-
diation (Biglaiser (1993), Gehrig (1993), Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1987), Spulber (1996),
Rust and Hall (2001)) and to the more recent and quickly growing one on two-sided mar-
kets (Caillaud and Jullien (2003), Evans (2003), Rochet and Tirole (2003), Armstrong
(2006), Hagiu (2006)). The former was mostly focused on traditional intermediaries, who
buy and resell goods, while the latter was inspired by the rising importance of "new econ-
omy" intermediaries, who connect buyers and sellers and provide matching, price discovery,
certification, advertising and other informational services, without (usually) assuming full
control over the transactions.2 However, these two strands of research do share one element
in common: intermediaries are presumed to create value by reducing search and transac-
tion costs and the "technologies" which enable them to do so are generally taken as given
(e.g. Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1987), Spulber (1996), Caillaud and Jullien (2003)).
To the best of our knowledge, ours is the first paper to open the "black box" of the
search service design by intermediaries and to show that their incentives with respect to
search effectiveness are ambiguous and fundamentally determined by the structure of the
revenues they derive from the parties they serve. By contrast, most of the economics
2Hagiu (2007) contains a unifying framework for analyzing these two forms of intermediation as two
extremes along a continuum.
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literature on two-sided markets to date has focused on the choice of pricing structures
by two-sided platforms as a function of various industry factors (relative strengths of the
indirect network effects on each side, relative demand elasticities) and has largely ignored
two-sided platform design issues.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section we lay out a
simple model and derive some basic principles regarding the incentives that a monopoly
intermediary may have to degrade the quality of its search service. Section 3 contains
several extensions of the basic model and shows that its main conclusions are robust.
Section 4 extends the analysis to the case in which store prices and consumers’ utilities
from shopping at each store are no longer exogenously given but depend on the platform’s
design decision. Section 5 concludes.
2. Basic model: exogenous surplus from transactions
We are interested in capturing the key factors which shape a market intermediary’s choice
of how to design the search service it offers to the parties it serves. In the stylized setting
we propose, an intermediary (which we will also call "platform") controls consumer access
to two "stores", 1 and 2, in the sense that in order to visit any of the two stores, consumers
must go through the intermediary.
We assume that all consumers derive utility uH from visiting store 1 and utility uL
from visiting store 2, where 0 < uL < uH . ui should be interpreted as encompassing the
utility of just looking around the store and the probability of actually buying something
and as being net of the price paid in case the shopper actually buys something3. There is
3 In section 4, we endogenize the stores’ pricing decisions.
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a unit mass of consumers, differentiated by their individual search cost c that they incur
whenever they search for and visit a store. We assume c is distributed on [0, 1] according
to a twice continuously differentiable cumulative distribution function F .
The platform is assumed to derive net revenues ri whenever a buyer visits store i ∈ {1, 2}
and for now, we take ri, i = 1, 2, as exogenously given. These revenues can be thought
of as the compensation that the intermediary is able to extract in exchange for directing
consumer traffic to the stores. If the intermediary owns the stores, then ri is simply equal
to the profits made by store i per customer visit. If by contrast the intermediary is a pure
two-sided platform which does not own the stores, then ri can be thought of as the fee that
store i has to pay to the platform provider.4
The key strategic variable that the intermediary chooses is the probability p ∈ (0, 1)
with which it directs consumers to their most preferred store (store 1) when they first
"arrive" on the platform. If a consumer does not find store 1 in this "first round" of
search, we assume she will find it with probability 1 in the second round, but only after
incurring her search cost c again. Similarly, if a consumer finds store 1 in the first round,
then she can find store 2 for sure in the second round if she is willing to incur her search
cost again. Given that uH > uL > 0, when consumers are looking for store 1 but find store
2 instead, they will shop at store 2 and then continue their search for store 1.
This stylized model (represented in figure ??) is an abstraction of many real world
intermediation situations: shopping malls (consumers and various retail stores); Internet
portals such as Google and Yahoo! (consumers, advertisers and content providers); mag-
azines (consumers, advertisers and content); Internet and brick-and-mortar retailers such
4This fee can be either a percentage of store revenues or a "per-click" (i.e. per customer visit) fee. For
instance, shopping mall developers charge their retailer tenants a percentage of their sales, while magazines
charge advertisers a fee based on expected readership and Internet portals charge advertisers a per-click fee.
In the basic version of our model, this distinction is not important; we explore its implications in section 4.
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as Amazon, Rakuten, Netflix, Wal-Mart, Costco, iTunes (consumers and various types of
products). The probability p can be thought of as being determined by the design of the
platform. For a brick-and-mortar shopping mall, it is determined by its physical layout
(how easy is it for shoppers to orient themselves?); for a magazine, it is the clarity of its
organization (how easy is it to find a certain article? is the table of contents clear? is there
any table of contents at all?); for an Internet search portal it is the relevance of the search
results provided (are they based purely on relevance or do they contain a lot of - more or
less - related advertising?).
 
Intermediary 
Store A Store B 
Consumers 
probability p of 
directing consumers 
to best match 
2.1. Derivation of the platform’s objective function
Clearly, consumers for whom c ≤ uL will shop at both stores no matter what they find in
the first round of search.
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Let us now analyze consumers for whom uL < c ≤ uH . If they find store 1 in the first
round, they stop. If they find store 2, then they shop there and then do a second round of
search to find store 1. Therefore, from an ex-ante perspective, they will bother to come to
the platform to look for a store in the first round if and only if:
puH + (1− p)
¡
uL + uH − c
¢
− c ≥ 0
which is equivalent to:
c ≤ u
H + (1− p)uL
2− p
The platform’s net revenues are then:
(r1 + r2)F
¡
uL
¢
+ [r1 + (1− p) r2]
∙
F
µ
uH + (1− p)uL
2− p
¶
− F
¡
uL
¢¸
(2.1)
It is easily seen that p has two effects on platform revenues as expressed in (2.1): a lower
p increases the revenues from "accidental" shopping at store 2 while searching for store 1,
but on the other hand, it also results in less shoppers coming to the platform because they
know the search service is not very efficient.
Assuming the maximization of (2.1) over p has an interior solution, we can write the
first order condition that determines the optimal p∗ if it is strictly between 0 and 1:
−r2
µ
F
µ
uH + (1− p∗)uL
2− p∗
¶
− F
¡
uL
¢¶
+[r1 + (1− p∗) r2]
uH − uL
(2− p∗)2
f
µ
uH + (1− p∗)uL
2− p∗
¶
= 0
In the appendix we show that the profit function is quasi-concave in p when either one
of the following sets of conditions holds:
1. uH sufficiently close to uL and
¡
uH − uL
¢
1
2
f 0(uL)
f(uL) < −
r1−r2
r2
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2. F is concave and r1 ≤ r2.
3.
F (Y )−F(uL)
(Y−uL)
√
f(Y )
is increasing in Y .
Throughout the rest of the paper, we will make the following assumption, which is
sufficient for ensuring quasi-concavity for all values of r1 and r2:
Assumption 1 F is concave and
F (Y )−F(uL)
(Y−uL)
√
f(Y )
is increasing in Y .
When the second-order conditions for a well-behaved maximization problem are satis-
fied, we can immediately derive the condition under which the optimal p∗ is less than 1,
i.e. the platform degrades the quality of search, which reduces to:
r1
r2
<
F
¡
uH
¢
− F
¡
uL
¢
(uH − uL) f (uH) (2.2)
The following proposition follows directly:
Proposition 1 a) The platform is more likely to degrade the quality of search when
r1
r2
decreases.
b) The platform is more likely to degrade the quality of search when uH increases if and
only if
F (Y )−F(uL)
(Y−uL)f(Y ) is increasing in Y
c) If F is concave then the platform is more likely to degrade the quality of search when
uL decreases.
Proof: Immediate. Notice that
F(uH)−F (X)
(uH−X)f(uH) decreases in X if F is concave.
¥
Thus, the revenues the platform obtains from shopping that takes place at store 1 have
to be sufficiently low relative to the revenues it obtains from shopping taking place at store
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2 in order to warrant having some shoppers lost on their way to store 1. Note that when
uH → uL condition (2.2) simply becomes r1r2 < 1.
Assumption 1 implies that
F (Y )−F(uL)
(Y−uL)f(Y ) is increasing in Y , therefore we have the some-
what surprising result that increasing the value at the most valuable store (uH) makes
the platform more likely to degrade search quality. When
F (Y )−F(uL)
(Y−uL)f(Y ) is decreasing in u
L
(which reduces to F concave), increasing the value at the least valuable store (uL) makes
the platform less likely to degrade search quality. This is understood by noting that when
the distance between uH and uL increases all other things being equal (in particular, keep-
ing r1r2 constant), the platform may start to find it profitable to divert some consumer traffic
to store 2 among the consumers who would otherwise never shop there...
To interpret this result we can notice that profits net of the fixed revenue (r1 + r2)F (uL) consists
in a margin r1 + (1− p) r2 applied to the variable demand coming from consumers with
search cost above uL. Then increasing uH for a given level of p raises both the level of
variable demand and its slope with respect to p. It is easy to see that the elasticity of
this variable demand is proportional to (
Y−uL)f(Y )
F (Y )−F (uL) . Then increasing u
H or decreasing
uL reduces the elasticity of demand with respect to p, hence with respect to the margin
r1 + (1− p) r2. This raises the incentive to increase the margin and thus to reduce the
quality of search.
In the appendix we show that condition (2.2) remains unchanged when there are N > 2
stores and all stores except for the most popular one generate the same utility to consumers.
Of course, with more than two stores, there could be more complex strategies as the quality
of search could depend in a contractual way on the number of searches performed, but we
abstract from such issues here.
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2.2. Optimal search quality
In order to investigate the effect of the various parameters on the optimal quality of search
chosen by the platform, let us define:
Y =
uH + (1− p)uL
2− p ∈
∙
uH + uL
2
, uH
¸
Then F (Y ) is total consumer "traffic" on the platform. (2.1) can then be rewritten as:
(r1 + r2)F
¡
uL
¢
+
∙
r1 − r2 + r2
µ
uH − uL
Y − uL
¶¸¡
F (Y )− F
¡
uL
¢¢
Noting that Y is strictly increasing in p, we can change variables and optimize over Y
for convenience. We obtain:
Proposition 2 If the optimal quality of search p∗ is interior ( 0 < p∗ < 1) then:
• p∗ only depends on r1 and r2 through r1r2 and is increasing in r1r2
• p∗ is decreasing in uH if and only if F (Y )−F(u
L)
(Y−uL)f(Y ) is increasing in Y .
Proof See appendix.
¥
The first important result is that the optimal quality of search deteriorates when r1r2
is reduced, as intuition might suggest. This prediction also fits well with some stylized
real-world examples: we expect search quality to be the worst in contexts in which r1r2 is
very low. This is the case with popular magazines: the margins made through sales of
content to consumers are very low (arguably 0), whereas most of the profits actually come
from advertising. It is not surprising then that the organization of such magazines is very
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frustrating for readers (as anyone having tried to find an article in a fashion magazine
knows). The same is true (to a certain extent) for shopping malls, where the pricing
structure is such that profits for the developer come almost exclusively from stores5.
The second prediction -regarding uH- is somewhat surprising: provided that
F (Y )−F(uL)
(Y−uL)f(Y )
(which is guaranteed whenever Assumption 1 is satisfied), increasing the value at the
most valuable store (uH) results in lower search quality (and therefore less total consumer
traffic). The result follows from the above remark that increasing uH reduces the elasticity
of the variable part of demand to p and thus to the profit margin.
2.3. Welfare
It is important to note that reduced search quality may be welfare-enhancing when con-
sumers do not internalize the entire surplus created by their search decisions. Clearly,
consumer surplus (and traffic) increases with the quality of search. From the joint per-
spective of the platform and the consumers, the monopoly level of search quality p∗ is too
small: thus there is excessive degradation of search quality. Still, the monopoly level p∗ < 1
can be socially superior to no degradation at all (p = 1).
Moreover, when the platform intermediates transactions between consumers and third
parties (such as stores), the socially optimal quality of search should account for the surplus
of these third parties. Thus one should add to r1 and r2 the profit that stores derive from
sales. Notice that accounting for the profits of stores amounts to replacing r1 and r2 by the
joint platform-store profit in the platform’s objective function. From the above proposition,
this has an ambiguous effect on the resulting optimal quality of search: the quality of search
5The interesting exception is warehouse clubs (e.g. Costco, Sam’s Club), which have a more balanced
pricing structure. Indeed, they make very low margins on sales of products and derive the bulk of their
profits from subscription fees charged to consumers.
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chosen by the platform may be too large or too small relative to the socially optimal level.
2.4. Platform competition
While we have not yet fully developed a model of search quality choice by competing plat-
forms, a few insights are immediately derived from the analysis above and general principles
of competition between two-sided platforms (in this case the two sides are consumers and
stores).
The impact of competition at the platform level on search quality crucially depends
on the intensity of competition for consumers relative to the intensity of competition for
stores. Indeed, given that two-sided platforms have to balance the interests of the two sides
they serve, competition will tend to make the balance tilt in favor of the side that needs
to be "courted" more assiduously by the two platforms, i.e. maximizing its surplus.
Thus, if for instance stores multihome and platforms are undifferentiated from con-
sumers’ perspective, all the action will be on the consumer side. Platforms will maximize
consumer surplus and it is easily seen that this leads to p∗ = 1 in our model since for any
c, consumer surplus is weakly increasing in p.6 In this case, competition leads to higher
effectiveness of search.
If on the contrary consumers can easily visit the two platforms but the stores need to be
attracted exclusively, and stores are perceived symmetrically by consumers before search,
it is easily seen that the resulting p∗ is the same as the one determined above and is lower
than 1 under the conditions we have already determined.7 In this case, competition leads
to lower search effectiveness.
6With Hotelling differentiation and unit transport cost t, we expect p∗ (t) < 1; dp
∗
dt < 0.
7This assumes that the platforms compete only in the probability p, and that stores coordinate according
to the Pareto criterion (no coordination failure). Things are probably different with asymmetric stores: the
more popular store may prefer a higher effectiveness of search.
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Consequently, competition may lead to socially insufficient or socially excessive search
quality, depending on its nature.
3. Extensions of the basic model
3.1. Revenues from total shopper traffic
Suppose that in addition to revenues ri from the transactions conducted by consumers
at stores, the platform provider also receives revenues t for each shopper who visits the
platform. t > 0 should be interpreted as a revenue coming from indirect sources, such as
advertisers paying for the privilege of reaching the consumer audience offered the platform.8
t < 0 can be interpreted as a cost incurred by the platform for serving each shopper9. The
expression of platform revenues (2.1) becomes:
ΠP = (r1 + r2)F
¡
uL
¢
+[r1 + (1− p) r2]
∙
F
µ
uH + (1− p)uL
2− p
¶
− F
¡
uL
¢¸
+tF
µ
uH + (1− p)uL
2− p
¶
We obtain:
∂ΠP
∂p
(p = 1) < 0⇐⇒ r1 + t
r2
<
F
¡
uH
¢
− F
¡
uL
¢
f (uH) (uH − uL)
Thus, the platform is less likely to degrade search when t is higher, i.e. when it extracts
more revenues from consumer traffic, which is quite intuitive. Also, it is easily verified that
the slope of the profit function with respect to p is increasing in t; implying that the optimal
quality of search is increasing in t.
8This is customary practice with shopping malls. For instance, Mori Building rents out various parts of
the "public" space (physical and virtual - giant television screens) within the Roppongi Hills complex to
companies wishing to showcase their products.
9Again, in the case of shopping malls, this cost may cover: printing maps, maintaining the cleanliness
of the complex, etc.
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This simple result may lead one to wonder whether allowing the platform to charge
access fees to consumers could not result in search quality degradation being superfluous.
In the next subsection we prove that this is not the case.
3.2. Platform charges access fees to shoppers
Suppose now that the platform can charge shoppers access fees A ≥ 0.10
In this case, shoppers with c ≤ uL shop at both shops and derive net utility uH +uL−
2c−A. Therefore they visit the platform if and only if:
c ≤ u
H + uL −A
2
Shoppers with c ≥ uL stop as soon as they find their favorite store, hence their net
utility from visiting is uH + (1− p)uL − (2− p) c−A, and therefore visit if and only if:
c ≤ u
H + (1− p)uL −A
2− p
It is then easily verified that:
ΠP =
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
pr2F
¡
uL
¢
+ (r1 + (1− p) r2 +A)F
³
uH+(1−p)uL−A
2−p
´
if A ≤ uH − uL
(r1 + r2 +A)F
³
uH+uL−A
2
´
if A > uH − uL
For large access fees, the quality of search becomes irrelevant because all consumers
who visit the platform search twice.
10We could envision negative fees but then all consumers would join the platform and only those with a
positive expected suprplus from search would engage in active search. The outcome would be the same as
with A = 0 but with additional lump-sum payments to consumers.
16
Let A∗ be the profit maximizing fee conditional on fixing p = 1; and suppose that
A∗ < uH − uL. Then the optimal level A∗ is given by:11
F
¡
uH −A∗
¢
f (uH −A∗) = r1 +A
∗
We can now repeat the analysis in sections 2.1 and 2.2 for a fixed value of the fee A∗.
The expression of platform profits is:
(r1 + r2 +A∗)F
¡
uL
¢
+ (r1 + (1− p) r2 +A∗)
µ
F
µ
uH + (1− p)uL −A∗
2− p
¶
− F
¡
uL
¢¶
The condition for search quality degradation to be optimal is the same as before, but
replacing uH by uH −A∗ and r1 by r1 +A∗. We obtain:
Proposition 3 If the platform can charge consumers access fees A, then the platform
will set p∗ < 1 if:
A∗ < uH − uL
and:
r1 +A∗
r2
<
F
¡
uH −A∗
¢
− F
¡
uL
¢
(uH − uL −A∗) f (uH −A∗)
where A∗ = argmaxA (r1 +A)F
¡
uH −A
¢
is defined by
F(uH−A∗)
f(uH−A∗) = r1 +A
∗.
11The slope of the profit function in A is:
F
?
uH −A
?
− (r1 +A) f
?
uH −A
?
if A < uH − uL
F
?
uH + uL −A
2
?
− 1
2
(r1 + r2 +A) f
?
uH + uL −A
2
?
if A > uH − uL
There may be a non-concavity at A = uH − uL if the slope at A =
?
uH − uL
?−
is lower than the slope
at A =
?
uH − uL
?+
which is equivalent to r1 +A > 12 (r1 + r2 +A).
The profit is quasi-concave on both ranges if Ff is increasing. Then a sufficient (but not necessary)
condition for A∗ ≤ uH − uL is F(u
L)
f(uL)
≤ 1
2
?
r1 + r2 + uH − uL
?
.
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Proof: Follows from proposition 1.
¥
When
F (u)−F(uL)
(u−uL)f(u) is increasing on the range
£
uL, uH
¤
, allowing for access fees thus
reduces the likelihood that the platform degrades quality. But provided that the fee remains
small, this possibility still exists.
3.3. Screening
When the plaform can charge an access fee and commit to individualized search quality,
it could use menus to screen between different types of individuals. Suppose that the
platform can propose any quality between pl < 1 and 1. Then the platform offers a tariff
A (p) (non-decreasing in p) and agents self-select by choosing p. We show in the appendix
that given the linearity of the profit and the utility in p, the optimal contract consists in
offering only the lowest and the highest quality (as opposed to a continuum).
Thus we study here a contract that proposes to choose between p at price Al, and p = 1
at price Ah > Al. Then consumers with c < uH−Ah are willing to pay for the high quality
service, and consumers prefer the low quality if
c < cl = u
L +
Ah −Al
1− p .
Let ch be the highest search cost among participants. Screening is optimal if the solution
of the optimal contract is such that ch = uH − Ah > cl > uL. Indeed a solution at
cl = uL would correspond to the highest quality of search only being offered, while a
solution with uH −Ah = cl would correspond to the lowest quality only being offered.
The expression of platform profits (using Al = Ah−(1− p)
¡
cl − uL
¢
and Ah = uH−ch)
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is then:
ΠP = pr2F
¡
uL
¢
+ (1− p)
¡
r2 + u
L − cl
¢
F (cl) +
¡
r1 + u
H − ch
¢
F (ch) .
Optimizing over cl and ch, we obtain:
c∗l = arg max
cl∈[uL,uH ]
¡
r2 + uL − cl
¢
F (cl)
c∗h = arg max
ch∈[uL,uH ]
¡
r1 + u
H − ch
¢
F (ch)
which are such that c∗h ≥ c∗l , with strict inequality if one of the two is strictly between
uL and uH .
Proposition 4 Assume that f(u)F (u) is non-increasing on
£
uL, uH
¤
. When screening is
possible, the platform screens if and only if
F(uL)
f(uL) < r2 <
F(uH)
f(uH) .
Proof: The condition is equivalent to uL < c∗l < u
H which ensures that some
consumers choose the highest quality of search, while others choose the low quality.
¥
When r2 is small then only the high quality is provided, while when r2 is large, only
the high quality is provided.
Corollary Assume that f(u)F (u) is non-increasing. When screening is possible, the
platform proposes a service with degraded quality of search if and only if
F(uL)
f(uL) < r2.
Proof: The condition is c∗l > u
L. Then either there is screening when c∗l < u
H , or all
consumers are proposed a low quality of search when c∗l = u
H . In the case c∗l = u
L, only
low cost consumers intending to visit both stores would choose the low quality, therefore
screening would just means a gift to these consumers and is suboptimal (Al = Ah).
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¥The condition is independent of r1 and uH provided that they are larger or equal than
r2 and uL respectively (with one strict inequality). The reason is that the screening is used
to extract surplus from infra-marginal consumers not to extend the size of the clientele.
The only consideration is then whether it is profitable to offer as an extra option a service
with degraded quality at a price attractive to consumers with a search cost above but close
to uL.
These consumers generate extra revenues r2 with probability 1 − p but need to be
compensated by a reduction in fee larger than (1− p)
¡
c− uL
¢
. This option is equivalent
in terms of payoffs to a mechanism in a first search of high quality requiring a payment
Ah, is followed with probability 1 − p by the possibility for the consumer of receiving a
subsidy cl − uL for conducting a second search. This mechanism is optimal if subsidizing
the participation of consumers to the search of the second-best store is optimal for the
platform. Hence the condition depends only on r2 and uL.
This intuition confirms also that whenever there is screening, then the platform sets p
at the minimal possible level.
3.4. Substitutability/complementarity between stores
Up to now we have assumed that consumers viewed the stores as independent, i.e. there
was no complementarity/substitutability among them. We now explore what happens to
the likelihood of degrading search quality when that assumption is relaxed.
Substitutability (complementarity) is modeled by assuming that conditional on hav-
ing bought product i, the utility from purchasing product j 6= i is reduced (respectively
increased) from uj to uj − γ (respectively uj + γ), where γ > 0.
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3.4.1. Substitutability
In this case, consumers with c ≤ uL − γ < uH − γ shop at both stores no matter what.
Consumers with uL − γ ≤ c ≤ uH − γ only shop at store 2 if they are diverted there
while looking for store 1. Their net utility is puH + (1− p)
¡
uL + uH − γ
¢
− 2c and is
positive if and only if:
c ≤
uH + (1− p)
¡
uL − γ
¢
2− p
Finally, consumers with c ≥ uH−γ shop at most at one store and then stop. Therefore,
they visit the platform if and only if:
c ≤ puH + (1− p)uL
Note that:
uH + (1− p)
¡
uL − γ
¢
2− p ≥ u
H − γ ⇐⇒ γ ≥
¡
uH − uL
¢
(1− p)
and:
puH + (1− p)uL ≥ uH − γ ⇐⇒ γ ≥
¡
uH − uL
¢
(1− p)
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Thus, we obtain the expression of platform profits:
ΠP =
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
(r1 + r2)F
¡
uL − γ
¢
+(r1 + (1− p) r2)
∙
F
µ
uH+(1−p)(uL−γ)
2−p
¶
− F
¡
uL − γ
¢¸ if γ ≤ ¡uH − uL¢ (1− p)
(r1 + r2)F
¡
uL − γ
¢
+(r1 + (1− p) r2)
£
F
¡
uH − γ
¢
− F
¡
uL − γ
¢¤
+(pr1 + (1− p) r2)
£
F
¡
puH + (1− p)uL
¢
− F
¡
uH − γ
¢¤ if γ ≥
¡
uH − uL
¢
(1− p)
We are interested in the conditions under which the platform will choose to degrade
the quality of search, i.e. choose p∗ < 1. Given γ > 0, for p close enough to 1 we will
eventually have γ ≥
¡
uH − uL
¢
(1− p), therefore if the derivative of the second expression
above evaluated at p = 1 is negative, we can conclude that the optimal p is smaller than
1. This condition is equivalent to:
r1
r2
Ã
1 +
F
¡
uH
¢
− F
¡
uH − γ
¢
(uH − uL) f (uH)
!
≤
F
¡
uH
¢
− F
¡
uL − γ
¢
(uH − uL) f (uH)
or:
H (r1, r2, γ) < 0
Clearly, for γ = 0 we obtain the same condition as before (2.2). Here we are interested
in knowing whether introducing some small amount of substitutability makes degradation
of quality more or less likely. In order to determine that, note that:
∂H
∂γ
(r1, r2, γ) < 0⇐⇒
r1
r2
<
f
¡
uL − γ
¢
f (uH − γ)
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If F is concave, we have:
lim
γ→0
f
¡
uL − γ
¢
f (uH − γ) =
f
¡
uL
¢
f (uH)
>
F
¡
uH
¢
− F
¡
uL
¢
(uH − uL) f (uH)
and therefore we obtain:
Proposition 5 When assumption 1 holds, introducing an arbitrarily small amount of
substitutability between the two stores ( γ → 0) makes it more likely that the optimal search
quality p will be less than 1.
¥
3.4.2. Complementarity
Similarly, assume now the stores are complementary, i.e. conditional on having bought
product i, the utility from purchasing product j 6= i is increased from uj to uj + γ, where
γ > 0.
It is then easily shown that:
ΠP =
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
(r1 + r2)F
¡
uL + γ
¢
+(r1 + (1− p) r2)
∙
F
µ
uH+(1−p)(uL+γ)
2−p
¶
− F
¡
uL + γ
¢¸ if γ ≤ uH − uL
(r1 + r2)F
¡
uL + γ
¢
if γ ≥ uH − uL
We assume γ is small enough so that we are in the first case above. Then the platform
will degrade search quality if and only if:
r1
¡
uH − uL − γ
¢
f
¡
uH
¢
− r2
£
F
¡
uH
¢
− F
¡
uL + γ
¢¤
< 0
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or:
r1
r2
≤
F
¡
uH
¢
− F
¡
uL + γ
¢
(uH − uL − γ) f (uH)
For γ = 0 we obtain (2.2). If F is concave then
F(uH)−F(uL+γ)
(uH−uL−γ)f(uH) is decreasing, therefore,
for small enough γ, complementarity between the stores makes quality degradation less
likely.
Proposition 6 When assumption 1 holds, introducing an arbitrarily small amount of
complementarity between the two stores makes it less likely that the optimal search quality
p will be less than 1.
¥
The intuition behind the results contained in Propositions 5 and 6 is quite simple:
complementarity makes it less necessary to divert people in order to convince them to
shop at store 2 (the attractiveness of store 2 conditional on having shopped at store 1 is
increased), while substitutability makes it more necessary.
4. Strategic use of search design in order to influence store prices
Up to now we have focused on exogenously given utilities. Suppose now that stores observe
the platform’s choice of design (i.e. the effectiveness of search, p) before setting their prices
and that the platform cannot control nor contract upon those prices. We will show that in
this case the platform may have an additional incentive to degrade search quality in order
to make the consumer demand faced by each store more elastic and therefore force them
to hold down their prices.
In other words, the platform may choose an imperfect search design (p < 1) in order to
force stores to take into account the possibility of increased traffic from "accidental shop-
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pers" - with lower valuations -, which puts pressure on stores to lower prices, resulting in
increased traffic on the platform. In other words, the platform can use design strategically
in order to alter the composition of consumer demand faced by each store, which influences
their pricing decision and thereby the total consumer traffic.
To analyze the strategic interaction between platform design and pricing by platform
participants, we now modify our basic model in the following way. We assume consumers
can be of two types, equally distributed in the population. Type t = 1 consumers prefer
store 1 to store 2 in the sense that the distribution of their valuation v for the product
sold by store 1 is GH with continuous density gH and that of their valuation for store 2
is GL with continuous density gL, where we assume the two distribution have a common
support.
Assumption 2 GH (.) has a lower hazard rate than GL (.), g
H(π)
1−GH(π) <
gL(π)
1−GL(π) , and
both hazard rates are monotone.
This assumption ensures that profit functions are well behaved and that demand from
type 1 is more elastic at store 1 than at store 2. Notice that it implies thatGH stochastically
dominates GL:
GH (v) < GL (v) for all v on the support.
By contrast, type 2 consumers prefer store 2 to store 1: the respective distributions of
their valuations for store 1 and store 2 are GL and GH . We assume that the distribution
of types within the population, GL and GH are independent of the distribution of search
costs c.
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Thus, the realized demand for store i when it charges price π is:
¡
1−GH (π)
¢
Ti +
¡
1−GL (π)
¢
Tj
where Ti is the total traffic of consumers of type i, i, j ∈ {1, 2}, i 6= j.
In this context, a consumer of type i derives utility:
uH (π) ≡ sH (π) =
Z
v≥π
(v − π) dGH (v)
from his favorite store when the latter charges a price π and utility:
uL (π) ≡ sL (π) =
Z
v≥π
(v − π) dGL (v)
from his second favorite store when the latter charges π.
Using integration by parts, we have:
uH (π) =
Z
v≥π
¡
1−GH (v)
¢
dv ≥
Z
v≥π
¡
1−GL (v)
¢
dv = uL (π)
For convenience, we define:
RH (π) ≡ π
¡
1−GH (π)
¢
RL (π) ≡ π
¡
1−GL (π)
¢
the revenues that a store derives from consumers for whom it is the favorite (respectively
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second favorite) store. Note that:
RH (π) > RL (π)
Under assumption 2, RH (.) and RL (.) are strictly concave and continuously differen-
tiable functions and:
πH ≡ argmax
π
RH (π) > argmax
π
RL (π) ≡ πL
As before, p is the probability that a consumer finds his favorite store at the first
attempt and is chosen by the platform to maximize profits.
We also distinguish now between two types of fees that the platform can extract from
stores: per sales charges ρ or per visit (click) charges r. Shopping malls charge retail
stores located inside a fixed percentage of sales. By contrast, web portals such as Google
charge advertisers on their sites per click fees. Similarly, magazines charge advertisers fees
proportional to readership.
4.1. Store prices are exogenously given
In order to understand the difference between per sales and per click/visit fees, let us start
with the case in which store prices are fixed and equal to π. Then, for consumers of both
types:
• consumers with c ≤ uL (π) visit both stores no matter what
• consumers with uL (π) ≤ c ≤ uH(π)+(1−p)uL(π)2−p always visit their favorite store and
only visit their second favorite store when they get lost on the way to their favorite
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store.
• consumers with c > uH(π)+(1−p)uL(π)2−p do not visit the platform.
If the platform charges per visit (click) fees r (to both stores), then store profits are:
¡
RH (π)− r
¢ 1
2
F
µ
uH (π) + (1− p)uL (π)
2− p
¶
+
¡
RL (π)− r
¢ 1
2
∙
pF
¡
uL (π)
¢
+ (1− p)F
µ
uH (π) + (1− p)uL (π)
2− p
¶¸
and platform profits are:
ΠP = r
∙
pF
¡
uL (π)
¢
+ (2− p)F
µ
uH (π) + (1− p)uL (π)
2− p
¶¸
Therefore, the platform will choose p < 1 if and only if12:
1 ≤
F
¡
uH (π)
¢
− F
¡
uL (π)
¢
(uH (π)− uL (π)) f (uH (π)) (4.1)
With per sales charges ρ, store profits are:
(1− ρ) 1
2
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
RH (π)F
³
uH(π)+(1−p)uL(π)
2−p
´
+RL (π)
h
pF
¡
uL (π)
¢
+ (1− p)F
³
uH(π)+(1−p)uL(π)
2−p
´i
⎫
⎪⎬
⎪⎭
and platform profits:
ΠP = ρ
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
RH (π)F
³
uH(π)+(1−p)uL(π)
2−p
´
+RL (π)
h
pF
¡
uL (π)
¢
+ (1− p)F
³
uH(π)+(1−p)uL(π)
2−p
´i
⎫
⎪⎬
⎪⎭
12Note that r does not affect the optimal choice of p: if the platform has all the bargaining power, it will
set r so that stores make 0 profits. Thus, the result that optimal design involves degraded search holds
even when the platform optimizes over r and p.
28
In this case, the optimal search quality p is less than 1 if and only if13:
RH (π)
RL (π)
≤
F
¡
uH (π)
¢
− F
¡
uL (π)
¢
(uH (π)− uL (π)) f (uH (π)) (4.2)
Comparing (4.1) with (4.2) and recalling that RH (π) > RL (π), we have:
Proposition 7 With fixed store prices, all other things being equal, a platform charging
per-click fees is more likely to degrade search quality for consumers than a platform charging
per sales fees.
¥
This result has a simple interpretation: per-sales charges make the platform’s interests
more aligned with those of the stores, therefore it does not need to degrade search as much.
4.2. Design p affects store prices
Let us now turn to the case in which platform design p influences store prices, i.e. when
stores set their prices in response to the platform’s choice of design. This adds an additional
channel through which p can impact platform profits. To see this, let us write:
dΠP
dp
=
∂ΠP
∂p
+
∂ΠP
∂π
dπ
dp
(4.3)
where π is the (symmetric) price charged by the stores. The first effect will be the same as
before: p determines consumer traffic on the platform and at the individual stores, thereby
directly impacting platform profits. The second effect is new: it captures the impact that
platform design has on store prices. Indeed, p affects not only total consumer traffic on the
13Same observation regarding ρ as the one above regarding r.
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platform and at each individual store, but also the composition of that traffic for each store
- high and low valuation consumers -, which the stores will take into account in setting
their prices. In this section we will be interested in determining the sign of this effect, i.e.
in whether the fact that the platform’s design decision can influence store prices makes it
more or less likely for the platform to degrade search quality. As we will see, the nature
of the fees that the platform extracts from stores - per visit/click or per sales - plays an
important role in determining that sign.
In terms of timing, we assume that consumers do not observe store prices before visiting
the platform and the stores, however they have rational expectations regarding store prices.
In other words, in equilibrium, expected values of store prices are equal to the actual prices
charged by stores14. This is equivalent to assuming that stores set their prices taking total
consumer traffic on the platform as given.
Denote by πe the price that consumers expect each store to charge (stores are sym-
metric, therefore π1 = π2 in equilibrium). Then, recalling that the traffic at each store
is composed of consumers who favor that store over the other and consumers who prefer
the other store, we can write the expression of store profits (assume 0 marginal costs) as a
function of the actual price charged π and the expected symmetric price πe:
• if the platform charges per click fees:
£
RH (π)− r
¤ 1
2
F
µ
uH (πe) + (1− p)uL (πe)
2− p
¶
+
£
RL (π)− r
¤ 1
2
∙
pF
¡
uL (πe)
¢
+ (1− p)F
µ
uH (πe) + (1− p)uL (πe)
2− p
¶¸
14The alternative is to assume that consumers observe store prices before making their search decisions.
While the analysis of this case turns out to be slightly more complicated, the results remain unchanged.
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• if the platform charges per sales fees:
(1− ρ)
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
RH (π) 12F
³
uH(πe)+(1−p)uL(πe)
2−p
´
+RL (π) 12
h
pF
¡
uL (πe)
¢
+ (1− p)F
³
uH(πe)+(1−p)uL(πe)
2−p
´i
⎫
⎪⎬
⎪⎭
In both cases, the equilibrium symmetric price charged by the stores π∗ satisfies:
π∗ = argmax
π
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
RH (π)F
³
uH(π∗)+(1−p)uL(π∗)
2−p
´
+RL (π)
h
pF
¡
uL (π∗)
¢
+ (1− p)F
³
uH(π∗)+(1−p)uL(π∗)
2−p
´i
⎫
⎪⎬
⎪⎭
Or:
π∗ = argmax
π
⎧
⎨
⎩R
H (π) +RL (π)
⎡
⎣ pF
¡
uL (π∗)
¢
F
³
uH(π∗)+(1−p)uL(π∗)
2−p
´ + (1− p)
⎤
⎦
⎫
⎬
⎭ (4.4)
Expression (4.4) defines a function π∗ (p) which the following lemma shows is increasing.
Lemma 1 Assume that (4.4) defines a unique function p→ π∗ (p) , then this function
is increasing in p.
Proof In the appendix.
¥
Note that this expression of π∗ (p) contains the essence of our idea: the platform’s
choice of a lower p gives a higher weight to the low valuation consumers in the composition
of demand faced by each store, which drives the equilibrium price down.15
Let us now turn to the expression of platform profits:
15This conclusion would be unchanged if we allowed for a more general formulation, in which stores set a
single price for their sales on the platform, as well as for sales that occur outside of the platform (through
store fronts on other platforms for instance). In that case, it is reasonable to expect the "responsiveness"
of store prices to platform design dπ
∗
dp will be reduced, but still positive.
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• with per click charges r:
ΠPclick = r
∙
pF
¡
uL (π∗ (p))
¢
+ (2− p)F
µ
uH (π∗ (p)) + (1− p)uL (π∗ (p))
2− p
¶¸
• with per sales charges ρ:
ΠPsales = ρ
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
RH (π∗ (p))F
³
uH(π∗(p))+(1−p)uL(π∗(p))
2−p
´
+RL (π∗ (p))
h
pF
¡
uL (π∗ (p))
¢
+ (1− p)F
³
uH(π∗(p))+(1−p)uL(π∗(p))
2−p
´i
⎫
⎪⎬
⎪⎭
We have:
∂ΠPclick
∂π
(p = 1) = r
∙
f
¡
uL (π∗ (1))
¢ duL
dπ
(π∗ (1)) + f
¡
uH (π∗ (1))
¢ duH
dπ
(π∗ (1))
¸
< 0
since du
L
dπ < 0 and
duH
dπ < 0.
With per sales charges:
∂ΠPsales
∂π
(p = 1) = ρ
⎡
⎢⎣
dRH
dπ (π
∗ (1))F
¡
uH (π∗ (1))
¢
+ dR
L
dπ (π
∗ (1))F
¡
uL (π∗ (1))
¢
+RH du
H
dπ (π
∗ (1)) f
¡
uH (π∗ (1))
¢
+RL du
L
dπ (π
∗ (1)) f
¡
uL (π∗ (1))
¢
⎤
⎥⎦
But (4.4) implies:
dRH
dπ
(π∗ (1))F
¡
uH (π∗ (1))
¢
+
dRL
dπ
(π∗ (1))F
¡
uL (π∗ (1))
¢
= 0
therefore:
∂ΠPsales
∂π
(p = 1) = ρ
∙
RH
duH
dπ
(π∗ (1)) f
¡
uH (π∗ (1))
¢
+RL
duL
dπ
(π∗ (1)) f
¡
uL (π∗ (1))
¢¸
< 0
Given that dπ
∗
dp > 0 and recalling expression (4.3), we can conclude:
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Proposition 8 When the platform’s choice of search quality p is observed by the
stores before setting their prices, the platform is more likely to degrade search quality (i.e.
to set p < 1) relative to the case in which store prices could not be influenced by p. This
holds irrespective of whether the platform charges stores per-click or per sales fees.
¥
The key reason the platform has an additional incentive to degrade the quality of search
is because each store fails to internalize the effect of its price on total traffic on the platform.
Thus, the platform always finds it optimal to strategically lower p in order to lower store
prices.
5. Conclusion
We have proposed a framework for analyzing the incentives that market intermediaries
might have to reduce the effectiveness of the search service offered to the parties they
serve (consumers and stores that the intermediary controls access to). We have identified
two fundamental mechanisms. First, when an intermediary derives higher revenues from
consumers shopping at lesser-known stores relative to revenues from consumers shopping at
more popular stores, it is more likely to degrade the quality of the search service offered to
consumers (i.e. the probability that consumers find their favorite store in the first round of
search is less than 1). This result survives even when we allow the intermediary to charge
consumers fees for accessing its service. Second, the intermediary may have an incentive
to degrade the quality of search even further when its design decision influences the prices
charged by stores. Lowering search quality alters the composition of demand faced by
stores and makes it more elastic, therefore the intermediary can induce lower prices and
thereby increase total consumer traffic.
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While these results are quite intuitive, they challenge the conventional wisdom that
intermediaries - be they traditional merchants or two-sided platforms - create value by
reducing search and transaction costs. This helps make sense of strategies employed by
some intermediaries, which seem to purposefully make it hard for their consumers to find
what they want: shopping malls, retail stores, popular magazines and even Internet portals.
There are a few promising extensions to explore. Analyzing the effect of competition
among intermediaries on the effectiveness of the search service offered is the most immedi-
ate: we have provided some basic intuition for that in section 2.3., but a formal analysis is
needed. Secondly, one could look at a dynamic setting in which the quality of search (p)
is not known to consumers ex-ante, but some of them are repeat visitors. In this case, the
platform has to take into account the fact that consumers form expectations of p based
on their past experience and use adequate decision rules to decide whether or not to visit
again.
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7. APPENDIX
7.1. Derivation of conditions ensuring the platform objective function is con-
cave in p
Let Y be defined as:
Y =
uH − uL
2− p + u
L ∈
∙
uH + uL
2
, uH
¸
.
Note that Y is strictly increasing and continuous in p. We will henceforth optimize
over Y rather than over p. The expression of platform revenues (2.1) writes as:
(r1 + r2)F
¡
uL
¢ ∙
r1 − r2 + r2
µ
uH − uL
Y − uL
¶¸ £
F (Y )− F
¡
uL
¢¤
and its derivative with respect to Y is:
−r2
uH − uL
(Y − uL)2
£
F (Y )− F
¡
uL
¢¤
+
∙
r1 − r2 + r2
uH − uL
Y − uL
¸
f (Y )
=
(
r2
"
1−
F (Y )− F
¡
uL
¢
(Y − uL) f (Y )
#
+ (r1 − r2)
Y − uL
uH − uL
)
f (Y )
Y − uL
¡
uH − uL
¢
(7.1)
Note that if r1 > r2 and F is convex (implying
F (Y )−F(uL)
(Y−uL)f(Y ) < 1), then the derivative
above is positive for all p, therefore the optimal p is p∗ = 1.
A first sufficient condition for quasi-concavity is that the term in curly brackets is
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decreasing. This writes as:
−r2
"
∂
∂Y
Ã
F (Y )− F
¡
uL
¢
(Y − uL) f (Y )
!#
+
r1 − r2
uH − uL < 0 (7.2)
We have:
∂
∂Y
Ã
F (Y )− F
¡
uL
¢
(Y − uL) f (Y )
!
=
1
Y − uL
Ã
1−
F (Y )− F
¡
uL
¢
(Y − uL) f (Y )
!
−
Ã
F (Y )− F
¡
uL
¢
(Y − uL) f (Y )
f 0 (Y )
f (Y )
!
and for Y close to uL (i.e. uH close to uL):
1
Y − uL
Ã
1−
F (Y )− F
¡
uL
¢
(Y − uL) f (Y )
!
∼ 1
Y − uL
Ã
1−
f
¡
uL
¢ ¡
Y − uL
¢
+ 12f
0 ¡uL¢ ¡Y − uL¢2
(Y − uL) f (uL) + f 0 (uL) (Y − uL)2
!
∼ 1
2
f 0
¡
uL
¢
f (uL)
so that:
∂
∂Y
Ã
F (Y )− F
¡
uL
¢
(Y − uL) f (Y )
!
∼ −1
2
f 0
¡
uL
¢
f (uL)
Then the platform’s profit function is quasi-concave if uH sufficiently close to uL and¡
uH − uL
¢
1
2
f 0(uL)
f(uL) < −
r1−r2
r2
.
We can derive less demanding conditions for quasi-concavity by requiring that the term
between curly brackets in expression (7.1) is decreasing at the point where it vanishes:
−r2
"
∂
∂Y
Ã
F (Y )− F
¡
uL
¢
(Y − uL) f (Y )
!#
+
r1 − r2
uH − uL
= −r2
"
1
Y − uL
Ã
1−
F (Y )− F
¡
uL
¢
(Y − uL) f (Y )
!
−
Ã
F (Y )− F
¡
uL
¢
(Y − uL) f (Y )
f 0 (Y )
f (Y )
!#
+
r1 − r2
uH − uL
Evaluating the above expression at r2
∙
1− F (Y )−F(u
L)
(Y−uL)f(Y )
¸
+ r1−r2uH−uL
¡
Y − uL
¢
= 0, we
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obtain that the objective is quasi-concave if either one of the following two conditions
holds (they are equivalent):
1) ¡
uH − uL
¢ 1
2
F (Y )− F
¡
uL
¢
(Y − uL) f (Y )
f 0 (Y )
f (Y )
< −(r1 − r2)
r2
which holds true if F is concave and r1 ≤ r2. Conversely, if r1 > r2 then F must be concave.
2)
2
Ã
1−
F (Y )− F
¡
uL
¢
(Y − uL) f (Y )
!
−
Ã
F (Y )− F
¡
uL
¢
f (Y )
f 0 (Y )
f (Y )
!
> 0
We can rewrite this condition as:
f (Y )
F (Y )− F (uL) −
1
Y − uL −
1
2
f 0 (Y )
f (Y )
> 0
which reduces to:
∂
∂Y
Ã
F (Y )− F
¡
uL
¢
(Y − uL)
p
f (Y )
!
> 0
When F is concave this implies that ∂∂Y
µ
F (Y )−F(uL)
(Y−uL)f(Y )
¶
> 0.
¥
7.2. Derivation of imperfect search condition with N ≥ 2 stores.
Assume there are N stores and each consumer gets uH from shopping at her most favorite
store and uL from shopping at any of the other (N − 1) stores.
All consumers with c ≤ uL will shop at all stores and their resulting utility from visiting
the platform will be:
uH + (N − 1)uL −Nc
Consumers with c > uL will stop as soon as they find their favorite store. The utility
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from visiting is then:
uH − c+
h
(1− p) + (1− p)2 + ...+ (1− p)N−1
i ¡
uL − c
¢
Therefore, such consumers choose to shop on the platform if and only if:
c ≤
uH +
³
1−(1−p)N
p − 1
´
uL
1−(1−p)N
p
We obtain:
ΠP = (r1 + r2)F
¡
uL
¢
+
"
r1 +
Ã
1− (1− p)N
p
− 1
!
r2
#⎡
⎣F
⎛
⎝
uH +
³
1−(1−p)N
p − 1
´
uL
1−(1−p)N
p
⎞
⎠− F
¡
uL
¢⎤⎦
Taking the derivative of ΠP at p = 1, we obtain:
∂ΠP
∂p
(p = 1) < 0⇐⇒ r1
r2
<
F
¡
uH
¢
− F
¡
uL
¢
(uH − uL) f (uH)
which is exactly the same as (2.2).
¥
7.3. Proof of Proposition 2
The derivative of platform profits with respect to p is:
∂Π
∂p
= −r2
µ
F
µ
uH + (1− p)uL
2− p
¶
− F
¡
uL
¢¶
+[r1 + (1− p) r2]
uH − uL
(2− p)2
f
µ
uH + (1− p)uL
2− p
¶
Dividing by r2, it is clear that ∂Π∂p is increasing in
r1
r2
. This implies that p∗ (the solution
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to ∂Π∂p = 0) is increasing in
r1
r2
.
∂2Π
∂p∂uH
= −r2f (Y )
2− p +
[r1 + (1− p) r2]
(2− p)2
µ
f (Y ) +
uH − uL
2− p f
0 (Y )
¶
Evaluating this expression at ∂Π∂p = 0 we obtain:
∂2Π
∂p∂uH
(p = p∗) = −r2f (Y )
2− p∗ +
r2
¡
F (Y )− F
¡
uL
¢¢
f (Y )
µ
f (Y )
uH − uL +
f 0 (Y )
2− p∗
¶
Regrouping and recalling that Y − uL = uH−uL2−p , we have:
∂2Π
∂p∂uH
(p = p∗) < 0⇐⇒ f (Y )
F (Y )− F (uL) −
1
Y − uL −
f 0 (Y )
f (Y )
> 0
or:
∂2Π
∂p∂uH
(p = p∗) < 0⇐⇒ ∂
∂Y
Ã
F (Y )− F
¡
uL
¢
(Y − uL) f (Y )
!
> 0
¥
7.4. Proof of optimality of non-linear tariff with only the highest and lowest
search qualities offered
The tariff A (p) can be assumed to be non-decreasing without loss of generality. Denote by
(p (c) , A (c)) the quality and the tariff paid by consumer c, where A (c) ≡ A (p (c)).
A consumer with c < uL chooses the lowest quality as she is indifferent, provided
A (pL) < uH − uL. The utility of a consumer with search cost between uL and uH is then
U (c) = max
p
©
uH + (1− p)uL −A (p)− (2− p) c
ª
.
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Notice that setting A (c) ≥ uH − uL is useless for screening purpose as only consumers
with c < uL would accept such a fee and these consumers search twice anyway (indeed,
U (c) ≥ 0 implies that A (c) < uH − uL).
Incentive compatibility then writes for c between uL and cˆ, where cˆ is the largest
individual search cost among participating consumers16:
U 0 (c) = − (2− p (c))
U
¡
uL
¢
= uH − uL −A (pL)
U (cˆ) = 0
p (c) is non-decreasing
The last constraint is that A (c) ≥ 0 as any consumer could claim the charge A (c) and
not search. Given that A (c) is non decreasing this reduces to A
¡
uL
¢
≥ 0 or
U
¡
uL
¢
≤ uH − uL
Notice this ensures also that any consumer prefers his contract (p (c) , A (c)) to a con-
tract with no search.
The profit derived by the platform from consumer c is then:
r1 + r2 +A
¡
uL
¢
= r1 + r2 +
¡
uH − uL
¢
− U
¡
uL
¢
if c ≤ uL
r1 + (1− p (c)) r2 +A (c) = r1 + (1− p (c)) r2 + uH + (1− p (c))uL − (2− p (c)) c− U (c)
16The first order condition for optimal choice of p by a consumer with search cost c is:
A0 (p) = c− uL
The second order condition requires A00 (p) < 0, hence p (c) is non-decreasing.
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We assume that F (c)f(c) is increasing which ensures that the solution will verify the second-
order conditions for incentive compatibility.
The expression of platform profits is then:
ΠP =
¡
r1 + r2 +
¡
uH − uL
¢¢
F
¡
uL
¢
−
µZ cˆ
uL
(2− p (c)) dc
¶
F
¡
uL
¢
+
Z cˆ
uL
¡
r1 + (1− p (c)) r2 + uH + (1− p (c))uL − (2− p (c)) c
¢
dF (c)
−
Z cˆ
uL
µZ cˆ
c
(2− p (u)) du
¶
dF (c)
which can be written as
ΠP =
¡
r1 + r2 +
¡
uH − uL
¢¢
F
¡
uL
¢
+
Z cˆ
uL
½
r1 + uH −
µ
c+
F (c)
f (c)
¶
+ (1− p (c))
∙
r2 + uL −
µ
c+
F (c)
f (c)
¶¸¾
dF (c) .
that we maximize under the following constraint:
Z cˆ
uL
(2− p (c)) dc ≤ uH − uL
We then obtain:
p (c) = p0 if r2 + u
L > c+
F (c)
f (c)
+ λ
p (c) = 1 if r2 + u
L < c+
F (c)
f (c)
+ λ
where λ is the multiplier of the non-negativity constraint.
¥
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7.5. Proof of Lemma 1
Let:
β (p, π) =
pF
¡
uL (π)
¢
F
³
uH(π)+(1−p)uL(π)
2−p
´ + (1− p)
We have:
∂β
∂p
= −1 +
F
¡
uL (π)
¢
F
³
uH(π)+(1−p)uL(π)
2−p
´ + p ∂
∂p
⎛
⎝ F
¡
uL (π)
¢
F
³
uH(π)+(1−p)uL(π)
2−p
´
⎞
⎠ < 0
for all π.
Let then:
φ (β) = argmax
π
RH (π) +RL (π)β
Assumption 2 implies that φ (β) ∈
£
πL, πH
¤
. On this range RL (.) is decreasing whilst
RH (.) is increasing. In particular ∂
2
∂β∂π
¡
RH (π) +RL (π)β
¢
= ∂∂π
¡
RL (π)
¢
< 0. This
implies that φ (β) is decreasing.
Thus, (4.4) can then be rewritten as:
π∗ = φ (β (p, π∗))
Using the implicit function theorem, we obtain:
dπ∗
dp
=
dφ
dβ
∂β
∂p
1− dφdβ
∂β
∂π
But the uniqueness condition for the process of tatonnement between consumer expec-
tations and actual prices charged by the store, along with the fact that φ (β (p, πL)) > πL
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imply:
1 >
¯¯¯¯
dφ
dβ
∂β
∂π
¯¯¯¯
Thus, we can conclude that:
dπ∗
dp
> 0
¥
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